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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on executive compensation in 
China’s listed firms. We find that the cash flow rights of ultimate controlling 
shareholders have a positive effect on the pay-performance relationship, while a 
divergence between control rights and cash flow rights has a significantly negative 
effect on the pay-performance relationship. We divide our sample based on ultimate 
controlling shareholders’ type into state owned enterprises (SOE), state assets 
management bureaus (SAMB), and privately controlled firms. We find that in SOE 
controlled firms cash flow rights have a significant impact on accounting based 
pay-performance relationship. In privately controlled firms, cash flow rights affect the 
market based pay-performance relationship. In SAMB controlled firms, CEO pay 
bears no relationship with either accounting or market based performance. The 
evidence suggests that CEO pay is inefficient in firms where the state is the 
controlling shareholder because it is insensitive to market based performance 
but consistent with the efforts of controlling shareholders to maximize their private 
benefit.   
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Disproportional ownership structure and pay-performance 
relationship: evidence from China’s listed firms 
1. Introduction 
 In recent years two strands of research on the effect of ownership structure on 
pay-performance relationships have begun to emerge. The first focuses on the effects 
of cash flow rights and divergence between control rights and cash flow rights (excess 
control rights) on CEO pay (Masulis et al., 2009; Barontini and Bozzi, 2010). With 
US dual-class firms, Masulis et al. (2009) find that the divergence between an 
insider’s control and cash flow rights has a positive effect on CEO pay, while from a 
sample of Italian listed firms, Barontini and Bozzi (2010) acknowledged that there is a 
negative effect. The second strand focuses on the effects of an ultimate controlling 
shareholder’s type on the pay-performance relationship, particularly between state and 
non-state owned firms in transition economies such as China. For example, Kato and 
Long (2005) find that state ownership weakened the pay-performance relationship. 
Firth et al. (2006) find that distinct types of controlling shareholders have different 
impacts on the use of incentive pay for CEOs, and they provide evidence that CEO 
pay is weakly related to firm performance in firms whose controlling shareholder is 
either the central government or a private owner. We extend their research by 
explicitly examining how a controlling shareholder’s type, cash flow rights and excess 
control rights shape CEO pay and the pay-performance relationship.  
 Several studies find that the wedge between cash flow and control rights affects 
firm value (Cleassens et al., 2002; Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Laeven and Levine, 2008; 
Gompers et al., 2010). Indeed through a common practice of ownership concentration 
and pyramid structure, controlling shareholders in emerging markets can exercise 
control through voting rights despite having relatively small proportional cash flow 
rights. This excess control rights gives controlling shareholders an incentive to 
expropriate the wealth of other investors and pursue their own interests, which are 
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often diametrically opposed to those of minority shareholders (Chen et al., 2011). The 
issues regarding the expropriation of minority shareholders are especially relevant in 
economies with weak legal protection or poorer governance standards (La Porta et al., 
1999, 2000; Johnson et al. 2000; Peng et al., 2011). Conflicts between the largest 
shareholders and minority shareholders are particularly severe in transition economies 
where the ownership is highly concentrated and investors lack legal protection 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Lin et al., 2010). The general consensus is that a 
disproportional ownership structure allows for easier expropriation of the wealth of 
minority shareholders, which results in lower a firm’s value. Fan et al. (2011) further 
suggest that the cost of expropriation may ultimately be born by the controlling 
shareholders and that they would need to devote substantial resources to their 
expropriation activities. However, the question of whether the controlling 
shareholder’s excess control rights affects CEO pay remains unexplored in the context 
of disproportional ownership economy. CEO compensation is essential to provide 
management incentive, which is not necessarily consistent with the interest of 
minority shareholders. 
Aligning executive interests with those of shareholders is an important governance 
mechanism (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). In economies with concentrated ownership, 
the largest shareholders are often in charge of setting CEO compensations. The impact 
of ownership concentration and excessive control on executive incentives remains 
contradictory. Murphy (1999) suggested that the largest shareholders have strong 
incentives to directly monitor managers by relating CEO pay to firm performance. On 
the other hand, the separation of control and cash flow rights is able to adversely 
affect the pay-performance relationship, since the largest shareholders extract their 
private benefits by setting CEO compensation schemes unrelated to the wealth of 
minority shareholders but to the controlling shareholder’s private interest. To help 
understand these questions, we use the unique Chinese context
1
 to examine the effect 
                                                        
1
 Firth et al. (2006) suggest that “China’s listed firms have unique ownership characteristics where the 
largest shareholder usually has effective control. Most listed firms have a dominant shareholder that 
helps shape the strategies and policies of the company. The dominant shareholder can exercise 
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of ownership structure, specifically cash flow rights and control rights of the ultimate 
controlling shareholders, on the pay-performance relationship. 
China’s economic transition follows a path of partial privatization, in which the 
state retains control over many SOEs by floating only a small percentage of shares to 
the public. It does this through creating a long principal-agent chain, a significant 
pyramid structure, and cross-shareholdings of ownership. As a result, the state 
controlling shareholders have substantial control rights in excess of their cash flow 
rights. At the same time, many privately controlled firms were also listed in the capital 
markets in China through initial public offerings (IPOs) along the development of 
these Chinese markets after 2001.  
State controlled and privately controlled firms have different operating objectives 
due to the nature of their ownership and are also subject to different regulations. It is 
argued that state controlled firms operate with multiple objectives that vary between 
maximizing the wealth of shareholders, maintaining urban employment levels, and 
controlling sensitive industries (Clarke, 2003). Fan et al. (2011) also argued that state 
ownership, which is often non-tradable or not freely-transferrable, can have a 
significant impact on managerial incentive schemes. Therefore, it is important to 
distinguish between state and private-controlled firms because they may intend to use 
different incentive schemes. 
However, due to the complex ownership structure of state controlled firms, it is 
also important to distinguish amongst state controlled firms. State controlling 
shareholders may belong to different state owned entities and government agencies 
and each of them may have different objectives and therefore desire to adopt different 
pay schemes. Therefore we classified state controlled firms into two categories based 
on their ultimate controlling shareholders: state assets management bureaus (SAMBs), 
and state owned enterprises (SOEs). SAMB is a government agency responsible for 
                                                                                                                                                              
substantial control over a firm by way of board representation as well as through voting rights. In many 
cases it is the State, local, city, or regional government that has the controlling share stake. In other cases, 




managing and controlling state owned assets. In SAMB controlled firms, CEOs work 
as representatives of the government, so their pay scheme may not be based purely on 
economic performance. In contrast, the publicized goal for SOE controlled firms is to 
maximize the firm’s value and incentivize management.    
Historically, most general managers of state controlled firms worked as 
bureaucrats and were paid according to the civil service pay scale. Since 1985, China 
introduced wage reform and other economic reforms in state controlled firms to 
improve the management compensation scheme. In 2000, the Ministry of Labor 
announced that CEO payment in state controlled firms should be linked to a firm’s 
economic performance (the Ministry of Labor, 2000). However, this did not provide 
sufficient incentive as firms still operated under the previous system where profits and 
wages were being redistributed by the state (Yueh, 2004). With the establishment of 
two stock exchanges in the early 1990s and the State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) in 2003, many state 
controlled firms were restructured and listed on the two stock exchanges. Since 2003, 
many regulations have been promulgated by SASAC to evaluate SOE performance 
and align this with CEO pay. Specifically, SASAC issued ‘Interim regulations on the 
evaluation of the top executive operating performance’ in SOEs affiliated to the 
central government (SOECGs) in 2003, which clearly stated that top executive pay 
should be aligned to total profits and sales and described how to evaluate executive 
performance
2
. In 2006 and 2010, SASAC updated this regulation by adding some 
extra rules such as the punishment of top executives when they were underperforming. 
Obviously, by putting these regulations into practice, SASAC has decreed that 
profitability should be the primary measure of firm performance to which CEO pay 
should be linked. Meanwhile, to curtail CEO’s from expropriating shareholder wealth 
through excessive perks, SASAC also promulgated ‘Instructions on regulating top 
                                                        
2 Furthermore, in 2007 and 2008, the SASAC announced two ‘supplementary provisions’ of this regulation which 
made further efforts on aligning executive pay to firm performance in SOEs. Meanwhile, in 2004, 2006 and 2009, 
the SASAC also promulgated the ‘Interim regulations on the administration of top executive pay in SOECGs’, 
‘Interim regulations on the evaluation and administration of SOECG performance’ and ‘Interim regulations on the 
evaluation and administration of state owned financial institutions firm performance’. 
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executive ‘on-job’ consumptions in SOECGs’ in 2006
3
.  
These reforms and regulations of executive compensation in SOE controlled firms 
are largely aimed at aligning the interests of shareholders and management. Several 
studies document a positive pay-performance relationship in both SOE and privately 
controlled firms but not in SAMB controlled firms (Kato and Long, 2005; Firth et al., 
2006, 2007). These results confirmed that the goals of these reforms in SOE 
controlled firms and CEO compensation have been achieved to some extent.  
In China’s weak corporate governance environment, the largest shareholders have 
strong incentives to monitor managers and operations as their concentrated cash flow 
rights helps overcome the free ride problem. However, if control rights exceed cash 
flow rights, controlling shareholders are likely to pursue their own interests and may 
seek to expropriate minority investors by tunneling, related party sales, and 
transferring profits out of the company for personal gains (Johnson et al., 2000; Fan et 
al., 2011). Such conflicts of interest between the largest shareholders and minority 
shareholders will hamper the application of performance based pay incentives (Wang 
and Xiao, 2011). Therefore, the largest shareholders’ cash flow rights and excess 
control rights may have conflicting effects on the pay-performance relationship. Our 
first hypothesis states that: 
• H1a: Cash flow rights have a positive effect on pay-performance 
relationship. 
• H1b: Excess control rights have a negative effect on pay-performance 
relationship. 
Many controlling shareholders of China’s listed firms are state-owned entities or 
government agents, and state held shares are not tradable on the stock exchanges
5
. As 
a result, state shareholders have an incentive to set CEO pay based on 
accounting-linked performance indicators, since to maximize free cash flow, they 
either receive cash remittance or can expropriate other investors that have more 
                                                        
3 At the local levels, the local SASACs located across the country have also issued regulations based on their local 
specific characteristics according to the regulations from the central SASAC. For example, Beijing SASAC 
promulgated ‘Interim regulations on the administration of top executive pay in Beijing SOEs’ in 2004, which has 
similar effects of relating CEO pay to firm performance. 
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resources available. Therefore, market based indicators such as stock return often 
have no direct link to a controlling shareholder’s wealth. Accordingly, we argue that 
state shareholders emphasize maximizing profits rather than shareholder value. In 
contrast, since shares in privately controlled firms held by the largest shareholders can 
be freely traded, private investors are more concerned about market performance. 
Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
• H2a: Cash flow rights in state controlled firms have a positive effect on 
accounting performance based pay-performance relationship, while cash 
flow rights in non-state controlled firms have a positive effect on market 
performance based pay-performance relationship. 
• H2b: Excess control rights in state controlled firms have a negative effect 
on accounting performance based pay-performance relationship, while 
excess control rights in non-state controlled firms have a negative effect on 
market performance based pay-performance relationship. 
In China under SASAC, SOE controlled firms are directly and ultimately 
controlled by central and/or local governments. It is mandatory that state owners 
receive cash flows, including profits and dividends, because shares of SOEs are often 
not tradable unless approved by the CSRC and the selling price is only at book value 
(Xu, 2003). Since 2003, CEOs of SOE controlled firms have been evaluated 
according to a combination of annual performance measures such as return on assets 
(ROA) and return on sales (ROS). We therefore hypothesize that: 
• H3a: Cash flow rights have a positive effect on accounting based 
pay-performance relationship in SOE controlled firms. 
• H3b: Excess control rights have a negative effect on accounting based 
pay-performance relationship in SOE controlled firms. 
 SAMBs
4
 are the state agencies that hold non-tradable shares on the market. They 
do not have cash flow rights from these shares and payouts often have to be remitted 
                                                        
4 The term SAMB encompasses state asset management bureaus, state asset operating companies, and 
state agencies like the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Agriculture. However, SAMBs, located 
across provinces and cities, are merely agents of the central government that manage state-owned 
assets and invest them in listed firms. 
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directly to different levels of governments (Firth et al., 2006). The objectives of 
SAMB controlled firms are to carry out the instructions of the central or local 
governments and to maintain local employment levels rather than maximize the value 
of a firm. In most instances CEOs in SAMB controlled firms are officials from the 
government, with little or no professional background, no rights to select other top 
executives, and no responsibility for economic consequences (Zhang, 1998). We 
therefore hypothesize the following:  
• H4: Cash flow rights and excess control rights have no effect on 
pay-performance relationship in SAMB controlled firms. 
Our results indicate that CEO pay in SOE controlled firms is related to firm 
accounting performance (return on assets and return on sales), while CEO pay in 
privately controlled firms is related to market performance (stock return). However, 
there is no relationship between CEO pay and firm performance in firms controlled by 
SAMBs. Our regression results show that the cash flow rights of the largest 
shareholders enhance accounting performance related pay schemes in SOE controlled 
firms and improve market performance related pay schemes in privately controlled 
firms. However, the separation between control rights and cash flow rights shows 
negative entrenchment effects by significantly reducing the pay-performance 
relationship in both SOE and privately controlled firms. We also find that cash flow 
rights in SAMB controlled firms do not appear to affect the pay-performance 
relationship, which confirms the consensus that these firms do not really have cash 
flow rights because they must remit earnings back to their superiors (Firth et al., 
2006).  
We have made two substantial contributions to the literature. First, our research 
not only sheds light on how cash flow rights and excess control rights affect CEO pay, 
it also submits new evidence on how cash flow rights and excess control rights affect 
the  pay-performance relationship. Cash flow rights have a positive incentive effect 
on the pay-performance relationship while excess control rights have a negative 
entrenchment effect. Second, our study furthers the understanding that different 
performance based pay schemes are used between SOE controlled firms and privately 
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controlled firms. Cash flow rights and the divergence between control rights and cash 
flow rights influence pay-performance relationship across firms with different types 
of ultimate ownership. Our evidence suggests that CEO pay in firms with SOEs as the 
controlling shareholders is determined by accounting based performance but is not 
sensitive to market based firm performance. This is consistent with the private 
benefits of controlling shareholders, as the CEO pay scheme aims to maximize 
accounting performance in order to extract greater cash flows.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature; 
Section 3 outlines the data and methodology; Section 4 discusses the empirical results; 
and Section 5 presents the conclusions.  
2. Literature review 
 The separation of ownership and control by the largest shareholder has been 
researched extensively. For example, La Porta et al. (1999) argued that the ultimate 
controlling shareholders often use a pyramid structure and cross shareholding to 
obtain control rights in excess of their cash flow rights. With a sample of 1,301 
publicly traded corporations in eight East Asian countries at the end of 1996, 
Claessens et al. (2002) provided important evidence that cash flow rights have a 
positive incentive effect while the divergence between control and cash flow rights 
has a negative entrenchment effect on corporate governance. Similar results were also 
provided by Lemmon and Lins (2003), Laeven and Levine (2008) and Gompers et al. 
(2010). Chen et al. (2011) further argued that the disproportional ownership can also 
be due to political connections. By using a sample of 276 privately controlled firms 
that listed in markets via IPO between 1993 and 2008, they found that politically 
connected firms tended to maintain a significantly concentrated ownership control 
structure. Moreover, Johnson et al. (2000) argued that managerial expropriation is an 
important form of tunneling which lowers shareholder value, and Peng et al. (2011) 
pointed out that connected transactions are an alternative to tunneling depending on 
the different financial situations of firms. However, Fan et al. (2011), among others, 
argued that disproportional ownership structure may not always result in 
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expropriation especially when controlling owners need to devote substantial resources 
to carry out the expropriation. In this sense, they suggested that expropriation may not 
be the sole reason for concentrated ownership structures in emerging markets. 
Only recently have academics started to examine the effects of cash flow rights 
and excess control rights on CEO pay. Specifically, Masulis et al. (2009) found a 
positive relationship between excess control rights and CEO pay by using a sample of 
189 U.S. dual-class firms that made acquisitions during the period between 1994 and 
2002, while Barontini and Bozzi (2010) found evidence from a sample of Italian listed 
firms that CEO pay was positively affected by a low divergence of control and cash 
flow rights.  
Recent studies also provided evidence of the effects of blockholder ownership on 
pay-performance relationship. For example, John et al. (2010) examined an 
association between outside blockholder ownership and pay-performance sensitivity, 
by using a sample of 120 bank-holding companies from 1992 to 2000. They argued 
that the pay-performance relationship was positively related to blockholder intensity. 
A similar argument was echoed by Kim (2010), who suggested that the 
pay-performance relationship was positively determined by blockholder ownership. 
Several other studies examined whether the largest shareholder’s ownership affects 
the pay-performance relationship. By using a sample of U.S. insurance companies 
from 1994 to 1996, Ke et al. (1999) found that for public-held insurers, managerial 
compensation and ROA were closely related.  
China, as a transition economy, is an important and unique case study for 
examining the effect that different ultimate controlling shareholders, particularly 
between state and non-state owned firms, have on CEO pay and the pay-performance 
relationship. For example, by using a sample of China’s listed firms between 1998 
and 2002, Kato and Long (2005) found that the pay-performance relationship was 
weaker in state owned firms, thus making them less effective in solving agency 
problems. With a sample of China’s listed firms between 1998 and 2002, Firth et al. 
(2006) argued that firms having foreign investors or SOEs as their largest 
shareholders tended to relate CEO pay to accounting performance, whereas firms with 
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private controlling shareholders tended to relate CEO pay to the performance of the 
stock market. In contrast, by using a sample of China’s listed firms between 1999 and 
2005, Wang and Xiao (2011) provided evidence that controlling shareholders may 
have less incentive to strengthen the pay-performance relationship due to the private 
benefits they obtain from the listed firms. However, these studies only focused on 
who the controlling shareholder (i.e. owner type) was and their effect on the 
pay-performance relationship, they did not explain the channel through which these 
effects were exercised.  
In this paper we fill the gap by using samples of China’s listed firms between 
2002 and 2007 to examine how and why the disproportional shareholder ownership 
structure affects the pay-performance relationship. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Sample  
   We compile data from firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange between 2002 and 2007 because information on cash flow rights and 
control rights has only been available since 2002. We obtain firm characteristics from 
the Chinese Stock Market Accounting Research (CSMAR) database and the data on 
managerial compensation, board, and ownership structure from the SinoFin database. 
Both databases have been used in past studies of Chinese listed firms (e.g., Kato and 
Long, 2005; Firth et al., 2006, 2007). Similar to prior studies, we delete the ST and 
*ST
5
 companies from our population. We also excluded firms in the finance industry 
because of their unique accounting standards and incomplete information on the main 
variables used in our analysis. Our final sample consists of 1,129 firms and 6,297 
firm-year observations between 2002 and 2007.  
 
                                                        
5 ST stands for Special Treatment, refers to the listed firms that have already got negative net profits for two 
consecutive years. *ST refers to the listed firms that have already got negative net profits for three consecutive 
years and have the probability of being delisted from the stock exchanges. 
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3.2. Variable definitions  
3.2.1 Managerial compensation 
   Since 1998, Chinese listed firms have disclosed information on managerial 
compensation in their annual reports. Prior to 2005, firms only reported the aggregate 
compensation of their top three executives’ the sum of salary, bonus and other cash 
compensation. We follow Kato and Long (2005) and use the log of the average top 
three executives’ compensation as the proxy for managerial compensation. Although 
some firms started to use other forms of incentive compensation after 2006, such as 
stock options and restricted stock, the number of these firms account for less than 5% 
of the total listed firms. Because of data limitations for other forms of incentive 
compensation, we use cash and bonus compensation in this study.   
3.2.2 Firm performance  
   We measure firm performance by using both accounting-based and market based 
performance. We also use return on sales (ROS) to do robustness tests in addition to 
the return on assets (ROA) and annual stock return (RET), which is consistent with 
previous studies. For our analysis, we adopt industry adjusted measures of ROA, ROS, 
and RET, which are calculated as the difference between the firm specific and 
industry-median value of performance measure. We also repeat our analysis using 
Tobin’s Q (Q), measured as the ratio of market value to firm replacement value, as an 
additional measure of performance for robustness tests. We follow Merhebi et al. 
(2006) and Firth et al. (2007) and employ lagged values of these variables in the 
regressions because CEO pay responds to a firm’s previous performance. 
3.2.3 Ownership type, cash flow rights and control rights 
To examine the effects of ultimate shareholder ownership, we first identify the 
ultimate controlling shareholder by tracing the chain of ownership. We classify 
controlling ownership into three categories: SAMBs, SOEs and private ownership. 
We then define control rights as the weakest link in the chain and cash flow rights as 
the product of ownership stakes along the chain, which is consistent with previous 
studies (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2002). For example, firm A, the 
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ultimate controlling shareholder, owns 70% of the shares in listed firm B, which in 
turn owns 35% of the shares in listed firm C. We then decide that firm A controls 35% 
of firm C, B’s ownership being weakest link in the chain, while the cash flow right is 
24.5%, being the product of 70% and 35% (70%*35%). Through a pyramid structure, 
cross-shareholding, and dual-class stocks, the largest shareholder’s control rights were 
always in excess of their cash flow rights (La Porta et al., 1999). Therefore, in further 
tests, we replace cash flow rights with excess control rights, defined as the difference 
between control rights and cash flow rights, to support our main hypotheses. To 
determine effective control at any intermediate as well as ultimate level, we follow 
Claessens et al. (2002) and employ a cutoff level of 10% in our analysis.  
Table 1 lists the definitions of all variables we use in our analysis, including the 
control variables, which we take mainly from Firth et al. (2007) and Chen et al. 
(2009). 
        (inset Table 1 here) 
3.3. Sample statistics 
   Table 2 lists a summary statistics of variables for the full sample. Panels A and B 
present descriptive statistics on managerial compensation and firm characteristics, the 
latter covers the measures of firm performance, firm characteristics and the 
information on cash flow rights and excess control rights. Panel C provides summary 
statistics on CEO and board characteristics. Panels D, E and F report detailed statistics 
for managerial compensation based on years, industries, and dominant shareholders. 
Panel A shows that the mean (median) of CEO pay is 219,939 (160,000) RMB, which 
is equivalent to approximately 31,420 (22,860) USD. These pay levels were much 
lower than those reported in research for the U.S., U.K., and other countries (Brick et 
al., 2006; Merhebi et al., 2006; Kato et al., 2007; Basu et al., 2007). This pay level 
gap between China and other countries may be attributable to smaller firms, higher 
rates of CEO turnover, and/or lack of long term incentives (Firth et al., 2002; Kato 
and Long, 2005). Nevertheless, the means (medians) in Panel D indicate a steady 
151.7% (164.8%) increase in CEO pay across our sample period, ranging from 
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131,023(95,666) RMB in 2002 to 329,811 (253,333) RMB in 2007. Panel B shows 
that the average cash flow rights is 34.4% while the excess control rights is 6.4%, 
indicating a clear divergence between the largest shareholder’s control rights and its 
cash flow rights in these listed Chinese firms. 
As shown in Panel E and F, CEO pay varies across industries and firms according 
to the different categories of dominant shareholder. For example, the mean (median) 
of CEO pay in the commercial industry was 236,011 (178,683) RMB, whereas the 
mean (median) of CEO pay in the property industry was 339,343 (230,000) RMB. 
Likewise, the mean (median) for SAMB controlled firms was 177,740 (129,333) 
RMB, whereas the mean (median) for SOE controlled firms was 241,229 (190,400) 
RMB.  
       (Inset Table 2 here) 
4. Empirical results 
In this section we examine the impact of ownership structure on CEO pay and the 
pay-performance relationship in Chinese listed firms. We first examine how CEO pay 
varies across different ownership structure and then explore how cash flow rights and 
excess control rights related to CEO pay and pay-performance relationships.  
4.1 Ownership structure and CEO pay  
To provide some preliminary results regarding how CEO pay is related to owner 
type, Table 3 reports the significance of differences in means and medians of CEO 
pay between the groups. For example, the t-statistic (z-statistic) of -6.52 (-9.34) in the 
comparison of SAMB versus SOE shows that the mean (median) CEO pay was 
significantly higher for SOE controlled firms than SAMB controlled firms does. 
These results can be further summarized as follows: the negative t-statistics in the 
comparisons of SAMB versus all the other owner categories indicate that CEOs in 
SAMB controlled firms received lower payments, while the positive t-statistics in the 
comparisons of SOE versus all the other owner types suggest that CEOs in SOE 
controlled firms received the highest payment among all categories of listed firms.   
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       (Inset Table 3 here) 
4.2. Cash flow rights and pay-performance relationship 
   To test our hypotheses regarding the relationship between managerial 
compensation and firm performance, we examine the impact of ownership structure 
on the pay-performance relationships. Our method is similar to those employed by 
Core et al. (1999), Firth et al. (2006, 2007) and Canarella and Nourayi (2008) to test 
the effects of firm performance and corporate governance variables on managerial 
compensation. Before we run regressions, we also tested the Pearson correlations 
between each pair of variables (contemporaneous value) in our regressions and found 
they are lower, which indicates that multi-collinearity does not exist. To save space, 
we did not report these results here. 
In order to control for endogeneity of performance measures, we estimate 
regressions relating to the equations employed in this study using 2SLS. In the first 
stage we use an OLS model to obtain the fitted values of firm performance by 
regressing it on a set of lagged control variables in Equation (1). In the second stage 
we then estimate the following regression model in Equation (1) of CEO pay
6
: 
0 1 2 1 3 1 4
5 6 7 8 9
10
ˆ ˆ*
            
            
it it it it it it
it it it it it
it it
PAY CASH PERF CASH PERF SIZE
BOARD INDEP LEV DUALITY TENURE
FOR Industry Year
α α α α α
α α α α α
α ε
− −
= + + + +
+ + + + +
+ + + +
        (1) 
where i and t represent the firm and year, andεis the error terms related to 
unobservable features that explain cross sectional variations in CEO pay. PAY is the 
level of managerial compensation measured by the log of the average top three 
executive compensation levels. CASH is the cash flow rights of the controlling 
shareholders. In the additional tests we replace cash flow rights with excess control 
rights (EXCESS), defined as the difference between the control rights and cash flow 
rights of the controlling shareholders, to provide some supplementary evidence. 
ˆPERF is the fitted value of the firm performance variable obtained in the first stage 
regression. We proxy firm performance with four measures, namely the return on 
                                                        
6 Results based on OLS estimation are generally similar to 2SLS estimations. 
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assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS), annual stock return (RET) and Tobin’s Q (Q), 
and then regress these fitted variables in separate equations. SIZE is the log of the 
total firm assets, BOARD is the log of the total number of directors on the board, 
INIDEP is the proportion of independent directors, and LEV is the ratio of total debts 
to total assets. DUALITY is a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO is also the board 
chairman and 0 otherwise, and TENURE is the log of the CEO’s tenure with the firm 
as CEO. We also include dummy variables to control for industry and year effects. 
As shown in Table 4, which presents the results for Equation (1) broken out by 
different firm performance measures, the lagged industry-adjusted ROA, ROS, RET 
and Tobin’s Q are positively and significantly associated with CEO pay. This result 
suggests that top executives tend to be paid more in firms that perform well in the 
market, or have higher corporate value. For example, the coefficient on industry 
adjusted ROA indicates that one unit increase in industry adjusted ROA lead to a 
1.37% increase in CEO pay level (column 1). In addition, we find a positive effect of 
stock return on pay. This differs from the earlier findings by Firth et al. (2007) who 
depended on much earlier sample period and found that market performance did not 
provide an incentive to CEOs
7
. We also find a positive and significant effect of 
Tobin’s Q. These new findings of the positive incentive effect of market-based 
performance on CEO pay is largely due to the fact that Chinese listed firms have 
become more market oriented in the recent years. 
The negative coefficients of CASH (see Table 4) provide evidence that CEO pay 
is lower in firms where the largest shareholders have higher cash flow rights, and the 
coefficients are significant. Moreover, all the interaction terms used to test whether 
ownership is associated with performance based pay for CEOs are positive and 
significant. This finding provides evidence in support of Hypotheses 1 that cash flow 
rights have a positive incentive effect on the pay-performance relationship.  
In line with previous studies (Conyon, 1997; Hermalin and Wallace, 2001; Girma 
et al., 2007), our results also show that larger firms paid their managers higher salaries, 
                                                        
7 Using a sample of China’s listed firms from 1998 to 2000, Firth et al. (2007) find no relationship between CEO 
pay and market performance.  
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and with Basu et al.’s (2007) finding of a significantly negative effect of firm leverage, 
managerial compensation is negatively related to leverage, that is, firms with higher 
debt pay their managers less. This latter effect may be attributable to debt being seen 
as monitoring by external debt holders (John and John, 1993). 
       (Inset Table 4 here) 
Variables such as the size of a board and number of independent directors have a 
positive impact on managerial compensation. This interesting result contrasts directly 
with Conyon and Peck (1998) and Firth et al. (2007), who found a negative effect of 
the size of a board and an insignificant effect of the proportion of independent 
directors. Our results, however, are consistent with the evidence that small boards are 
more effective (Yermack, 1996) and large boards have a more doubtful influence on 
CEOs (Jensen, 1993). It also suggests that the proportion of independent directors is 
coming into line with the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission’s (CSRC) 
mandate that at least one third of board directors, who set CEO pay, should be 
independent. 
 We also find positive relationship between duality and CEO pay, which is 
similar to Core et al.’s (1999) findings that duality in U.S firms lead to higher CEO 
pay, but contrary Conyon’s (1997) analysis of British firms. We do note a positive 
relationship between CEO tenure and CEO pay, which is not only consistent with 
most previous studies (Brick et al., 2006; Cornett et al., 2008) but echoes the intuitive 
assumption of a relationship between CEO pay and years of experience (Palia, 2001). 
Interestingly, in line with our conjecture, we also find that CEOs receive higher 
payment if a firm has foreign investors. 
4.3 Cash flow rights and pay-performance relationship between state and 
non-state controlled firms 
We modify our first equation by dividing the ownership of the largest shareholder 
between state ownership and private investors. Our second equation is shown as 
follow: 
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where PSTATE is the cash flow rights of state controlled firms. All other variables in 
the second equation are defined the same as the first equation. 
Table 5 reports the regression results for Equation (2) with a primary focus on the 
ownership coefficients and interaction terms. A close examination of the interaction 
terms also reveals some interesting outcomes. They are positive when we use 
profitability to measure performance but are negative when performance is measured 
as stock return and firm value. This result shows that SOE controlled firms put great 
emphasis on profitability while privately controlled firms care more about market 
performance. In fact, during the period of this study, SOE controlled firms achieved a 
higher average growth in operating sales, which supports Hypotheses 2a. This result 
differs from Kato and Long (2005) who found that state ownership weakens the 
pay-performance relationship. While they examined the relationship between the CEO 
pay and performance, we mainly focus on the effect that cash flow rights have on the 
pay-performance relationship. We find that for the state controlled firms, cash flow 
rights have positive effect on accounting based the pay-performance relationship, 
while no such effect on market based the pay-performance relationship. Therefore, 
our results suggest that the effect of cash flow rights on the pay-performance 
relationship between state controlled firms and privately controlled firms depends on 
different performance based pay schemes. 
However, the coefficients are only significant for both CASH*ROAt-1 and 
CASH*ROSt-1, and insignificant for other terms, so we divide state ownership into 
two types of firms where the ultimate controlling shareholder is SAMB and SOE, 
respectively, and run the regression relating to Equation (3) in the following section. 
        (Inset Table 5 here) 
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4.4 Cash flow rights and pay-performance relationship across owner 
types 
We extend our second equation by dividing state ownership into the two types 
discussed in previous section: SAMBs and SOEs. The equation is as follow: 
0 1 2 1 3 1
4 1 6 1 7
8 9 10 11
12 13
ˆ ˆ*
ˆ ˆ           * *
           
           
it it it it it
it it it it it
it it it it
it it
PAY CASH PERF PSAMB PERF
PSOE PERF PPRI PERF SIZE
BOARD INDEP LEV DUALITY
TENURE FOR Industr
α α α α
α α α




= + + +
+ + +
+ + + +
+ + +
it
y Year ε+ +
                 (3) 
where PSAMB (PSOE, PPRI) is the cash flow rights of different types of shareholders 
if that shareholder is the controlling shareholder.  
The estimation results of Equation (3) are given in Table 6, where we apply the 
controlling shareholder cash flow rights to measure the ownership structure. Table 6 
reports generally negative coefficients on cash flow rights regardless of performance 
measures which indicate that cash flow rights will reduce the level of CEO pay.  
More importantly, we focus on the interaction terms. These terms are positive when 
firm performance is measured by ROA and ROS and are statistically significant for 
SOE controlled firms. The results indicate that in SOE controlled firms CEO pay is 
related to profitability and the cash flow rights enhance the pay-performance 
relationship, which is consistent with our hypothesis 3a. The coefficients are 
economically significant. For example, in column 1 of Table 6, the coefficient of 
PSOE*ROAt-1 indicates that in SOE controlled firms a 1% increase cash flow rights 
lead to a 8.8% increase in pay-performance sensitivity. The interaction terms with 
stock return measures of performance are positive and only significant when firms 
have private investors as the controlling shareholders. This result is consistent with 
our hypothesis 2a that a private controller is more likely to relate CEO pay to market 
performance, and again we find evidence that cash flow rights have positive incentive 
effects on corporate governance. However, the results of the interaction terms 
between SAMB and firm performance are insignificant, which is consistent with our 
hypotheses 4. When firms have SAMB as the largest shareholder, there does not 
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appear to adopt performance based pay schemes. The estimated coefficients on 
control variables are similar with those reported in Table 4 and 5. Overall, our results 
support the conjecture made by Firth et al. (2006) who believed that the stronger cash 
flow rights of SOEs and private investors (vis-à-vis the SAMB) induce such 
controlling shareholders to align CEO pay to performance whereas a controlling 
SAMB shareholder does not. We provide evidence that cash flow rights have positive 
effect on accounting based the pay-performance relationship when the controlling 
shareholders are SOEs due to the fact that their shares are not tradable. We also find 
that cash flow rights have positive effect on market based pay-performance 
relationship for firms whose controlling shareholder is a private investor. 
       (Insert Table 6 here) 
4.5 Excess control rights and pay-performance relationships 
In order to provide some supplementary evidence and disentangle the incentive 
and entrenchment effects of the largest shareholder, we repeat our analyses of 
regression relating the Equations (1) to (3) by replacing cash flow rights (CASH) with 
ultimate controlling shareholder excess control rights (EXCESS). The results are 
shown in Table 7 to 9. Our primary focus is on the interaction terms between 
ownership and performance. The general results show negative coefficients for most 
interaction terms which supports Hypotheses 1b, 2b, and 3b, that deviation between 
control rights and cash flow rights has negative entrenchment effects on corporate 
governance, which is reflected by a weaker the pay-performance relationship. We 
obtain opposite results when excess control rights are used instead of cash flow rights. 
These results are broadly consistent with previous studies on the separation of 
ownership and control (La Porta et al., 1999; Cleassens et al., 2002). Meanwhile, we 
find there is a positive relationship between CEO pay and excess control rights, which 
is consistent with the argument that it is easier for a CEO to expropriate wealth where 
corporate governance is weak, reflected by a higher divergence between control rights 
and cash flow rights (Core et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2002). 
       (Inset Table 7, Table 8 and Table 9 here) 
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   We repeat the analyses by winsorizing the top and bottom 1% of the CEO pay 
variable to excluding any influence from the outliers, and the results are broadly 
consistent with those shown in the previous tables. All firm performance coefficients 
are positive and significant. More important, the interaction terms between cash flow 
rights and firm performance are all positive and PSOE*ROAt-1, PSOE*ROSt-1 and 
PPRI*RETt-1 are statistically significant. 
5. Conclusion  
   China’s ongoing economic reform and corporate restructuring, which focuses 
primarily on improving management, is accelerating the corporatization of traditional 
SOEs. CEO and top manager’s incentives, being the central theme in such reform and 
great concern of largest shareholders, are poorly understood. We therefore take 
advantage of the mandate since 2002 that listed firms in China have to disclose the 
largest shareholder cash flow rights and control rights in their annual reports to 
examine the effects on the relationship between managerial compensation and firm 
performance.  
Our empirical results show that cash flow rights in the hands of the ultimate 
controlling shareholder have a positive effect on the pay-performance relationship. In 
particular, the higher cash flow rights can better align CEO pay with firm profitability 
in SOE controlled firms, and stock return in privately controlled firms. We also 
provide similar evidence to Claessens et al. (2002) that divergence between control 
rights and cash flow rights have a negative effect on the pay-performance relationship. 
These observations suggest that the development of a market economy in China has 
important implications for CEO pay. 
In the Chinese context, we examine the pay-performance relationship in firms 
where different types of controlling owners have dissimilar objectives and 
motivations. Our multivariate analysis results show that the pay-performance scheme 
has been relevant in SOE and privately controlled firms, albeit depending on different 
performance measures. In SOE controlled firms, CEO pay is linked to firm 
accounting performance (ROA and ROS) but not sensitive to market based firm 
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performance. This is consistent with controlling state owners whose shares are 
non-tradable but who are entitled to cash flows. This is also consistent with the 
private benefits of controlling shareholders because the CEO pay scheme is to 
maximize accounting performance in order to extract greater cash flows. In privately 
controlled firms, however, CEO pay is sensitive to market performance, which is 
consistent with literature on US firms.  
   Overall, our study results suggest that ownership structure and types of controlling 
shareholders have jointly affected the CEO pay-performance relationship in China. 
Therefore, to better understand the causes and consequences of CEO compensation, 
future studies should focus on the unique characteristics of the institutional 
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Managerial compensation (PAY) Log of the average top three executives’ compensation 
  
Firm performance and characteristics  
Return on assets (ROA) Net income / total assets  
Return on sales (ROS) Net income/sales 
Stock return (RET) Annual stock return  
Tobin’s Q (Q) Market value/replacement value a 
Firm size (SIZE) Log of total assets 
Leverage (LEV) Total debts/total assets in book value 
Foreign investor (FOR) Equal to 1 if the firm has foreign investors 
  
Ownership structure  
Cash flow rights (CASH) Cash flow rights held by the ultimate controlling 
shareholder 
Excess control rights (EXCESS) Difference between the control rights and cash flow 
rights 
PSTATE Cash flow rights of state controlled firms 
PSAMB Cash flow rights of SAMB controlled firms 
PSOE Cash flow rights of SOE controlled firms 
PPRI Cash flow rights of privately controlled firms 
  
CEO and board characteristics  
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CEO-chair duality (DUALITY) Equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board 
CEO tenure (TENURE) Log of years the CEO has been this position 
Board size (BOARD) Log of total directors on board  
Board composition (INDEP) Independent directors/total directors  
  
Other variables  
Industry (Industry) b Equal to 1 for the specific industry 
Year (Year) Equal to 1 for the specific year 
a
 Market value is measured as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt; 
replacement value is measured using the book value of total assets. 
b 
We create four dummy variables to represent the five groups of listed firms borrowed from Firth et al. 




Variables  Mean  Median  Min  Max  Std. Dev.   
Panel A: Managerial Compensation  
CEO average pay 219,939 160,000 6,666 470,6667 75,649 
 
Panel B: Firm characteristics 
Return on assets (ROA) % 2.26 2.64 -168.26 46.31 8.49 
Return on sales (ROS) % -0.043 0.039 -83.69 46.63 1.87 
Stock return (RET) % 39.69 -3.96 -90.93 1611.78 104.68 
Tobin’s Q (Q) 1.16 0.96 0.13 23.44 0.76 
Assets (millions) 3940 1770 27.3 719000 17600 
Capital structure (LEV) % 49.71 50.25 0.02 1037.51 25.87 
Cash flow rights (CASH) 34.41 32.17 0.51 100 18.11 
Excess control rights(EXCESS)
a
 6.38 0 0 70.56 9.06 
 
Panel C: CEO characteristics and board characteristics 
CEO duality (DUALITY) 0.11 0 0 1 0.31 
CEO tenure (TENURE) 2.55 2 0.08 12.42 1.85 
Board size (BOARD) 9.76 9 4 23 2.20 
Board composition (INDEP) 3.13 3 0 10 0.94 
 
Panel D: Compensation based on year 
2002 131,023 95,666 6,666 1,575,308 122,442 
2003 170,329 126,666 7,666 1,628,234 153,738 
2004 212,776 160,379 10,266 3,210,000 213,192 
2005 218,176 167,633 8,966 2,726,667 205,604 
2006 253,069 196,666 12,000 3,740,000 243,939 
2007 329,811 253,333 166,66 470,6667 315,655 
 
Panel E: Compensation based on industry 
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Industrial  202,353 140,333 7,200 3,486,567 209,495 
Commercial  236,011 178,683 13,666 1,309,300 203,546 
Public utility 245,134 202,383 11,424 1,848,030 204,141 
Property  339,343 230,000 12,566 4,706,667 485,295 
Conglomerate  231,535 185,870 6,666 1,707,057 194,260 
 
Panel F: Compensation based on ownership 
SAMB 177,740 129,333 9,246 1,225,333 160,800 
SOE 241,229 190,400 7,200 4,706,667 212,011 
PRIVATE 211,333 146,966 6,666 1,792,933 210,226 
The figures in Panel A are the average of six years from 2002 to 2007. 
The figures for all the value variables are in China’s currency, RMB. 
a 
Excess control is defined as the difference between the control rights and cash flow rights of the 
ultimate controlling shareholder, which is consistent with Claessens et al. (2002). This information is 




Test of Differences of CEO Pay across Ownerships. 















*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
a 
t-value from the t-test of differences in means. 
b




Regression Results of Cash Flow Rights Effects on CEO Pay. 
Dependent variable: managerial compensation 
Constant  6.098***(17.10) 5.450***(16.83) 7.388***(16.94) 5.022***(16.10) 
CASH -0.006**(-2.32) -0.007***(-2.71) -0.013***(-2.74) -0.008***(-2.05) 
ROAt-1 1.369***(3.79)    
ROSt-1  0.053**(2.04)   
RETt-1   0.175***(6.36)  
Qt-1    0.259**(2.07) 
CASH*ROAt-1 0.169*(1.94)    
CASH*ROSt-1  0.052**(2.03)   
CASH*RETt-1   0.051***(4.38)  
CASH*Qt-1    0.012*(1.69) 
SIZE 0.246***(13.97) 0.274***(18.18) 0.190***(10.41) 0.297***(19.07) 
BOARD 0.198***(3.68) 0.187***(3.50) 0.241***(4.44) 0.185***(3.57) 
INDEP 0.763***(4.61) 0.760***(4.55) 0.441**(2.43) 0.758***(4.45) 
LEV 0.091(1.36) 0.077(1.24) -0.081*(-1.70) -0.144***(-3.06) 
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DUALITY 0.098***(2.81) 0.091**(2.57) 0.089**(2.22) 0.081**(2.44) 
TENURE 0.077***(6.25) 0.086***(7.24) 0.068***(4.47) 0.095***(7.40) 
FOR 0.377***(9.66) 0.364***(9.07) 0.428***(9.99) 0.349***(8.72) 
Industry Included Included Included Included 
Year Included  Included Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 0.2012 0.1829 0.1215 0.1775 
Obs 3286 3286 3286 3286 
Dependent variable is managerial compensation. Four firm performance variables, ROA, ROS, RET 
and Q, are the industry-adjusted firm performance measures. These performance variables are actually 
fitted values and obtained by regressing them on a set of lagged control variables in their first stage 
regression respectively. CASH is the cash flow rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder. SIZE, 
BOARD, INDEP, LEV, TENURE, DUALITY and FOR are measured as in Table 1.  
The t-statistics, computed using the White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard error, are given in 




Regression Results of Cash Flow Rights of State and Non-state Controlled Firms. 
Dependent variable: managerial compensation 
Constant 6.375***(15.51) 7.292***(11.90) 5.957***(14.89) 5.015***(16.23) 
CASH -0.007***(-8.73) -0.007***(-7.90) -0.005***(-6.02) -0.005***(-5.77) 
ROAt-1 4.689***(4.25)    
ROSt-1  3.049***(4.26)   
RETt-1   0.424***(3.32)  
Qt-1    0.384**(2.26) 
PSTATE*ROAt-1 0.073*(1.83)    
PSTATE*ROSt-1  0.112***(3.82)   
PSTATE*RETt-1   -0.004(-1.17)  
PSTATE*Qt-1    -0.002(-0.03) 
SIZE 0.236***(11.63) 0.185***(5.82) 0.262***(13.53) 0.315***(21.86) 
BOARD 0.226***(3.75) 0.190***(2.74) 0.233***(3.60) 0.215***(3.55) 
INDEP 0.582***(2.96) 0.759***(3.27) 0.484**(2.31) 0.419**(2.10) 
LEV 0.145*(1.69) 0.577***(3.14) -0.144***(-2.78) -0.226***(-4.53) 
DUALITY 0.082**(2.05) 0.089*(1.93) 0.064(1.48) 0.060(1.51) 
TENURE 0.061***(4.38) 0.058***(3.64) 0.073***(5.23) 0.075***(5.68) 
FOR 0.385***(8.45) 0.445***(7.86) 0.381***(7.89) 0.345***(7.68) 
Industry Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included 
Adjust R
2 
0.2326 0.2203 0.2165 0.2321 
Obs 3286 3286 3286 3286 
Dependent variable is managerial compensation. Four firm performance variables, ROA, ROS, RET 
and Q, are the industry-adjusted firm performance measures. These performance variables are actually 
fitted values and obtained by regressing them on a set of lagged control variables in their first stage 
regression respectively. CASH is the cash flow rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder. 
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PSTATE represents the cash flow rights of state controlled firms. All other variables are defined 
the same as those in previous tables. 
The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard 




Regression Results of Cash Flow Rights across Three Types of Firms. 
Dependent variable: managerial compensation 
Constant 6.382***(17.69) 5.678***(16.70) 5.752***(15.85) 5.027***(16.12) 
CASH -0.006***(-7.19) -0.006***(-8.10) -0.005***(-4.93) -0.006**(-2.13) 
ROAt-1 8.306***(2.75)    
ROSt-1  0.756(1.23)   
RETt-1   0.549(1.45)  
Qt-1    0.718*(1.76) 
PSAMB*ROAt-1 0.130(1.57)    
PSOE*ROAt-1 0.088**(2.49)    
PPRI*ROAt-1 0.207(1.28)    
PSAMB*ROSt-1  0.012(0.56)   
PSOE*ROSt-1  0.003**(2.32)   
PPRI*ROSt-1  0.019(0.73)   
PSAMB*RETt-1   0.006(0.78)  
PSOE*RETt-1   0.006(0.78)  
PPRI*RETt-1   0.007*(1.76)  
PSAMB*Qt-1    0.001(0.04) 
PSOE*Qt-1    0.005**(2.25) 
PPRI*Qt-1    0.010**(2.33) 
SIZE 0.234***(13.20) 0.274***(16.86) 0.270***(15.35) 0.316***(21.53) 
BOARD 0.215***(3.49) 0.206***(3.36) 0.228***(3.52) 0.226***(3.61) 
INDEP 0.589***(2.94) 0.552***(2.79) 0.476**(2.25) 0.362*(1.80) 
LEV 0.232**(2.08) 0.023(0.21) -0.141**(-2.50) -0.238**(-2.27) 
DUALITY 0.076*(1.89) 0.070*(1.74) 0.053(1.24) 0.061(1.50) 
TENURE 0.057***(4.03) 0.075***(5.47) 0.073***(5.09) 0.075***(5.64) 
FOR 0.377***(8.26) 0.365***(8.06) 0.377***(7.78) 0.345***(7.62) 
Industry Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 0.2041 0.2173 0.2160 0.2293 
Obs 3286 3286 3286 3286 
Dependent variable is managerial compensation. Four firm performance variables, ROA, ROS, RET 
and Q, are the industry-adjusted firm performance measures. These performance variables are actually 
fitted values and obtained by regressing them on a set of lagged control variables in their first stage 
regression respectively. PSAMB (PSOE, PPRI) represents the cash flow rights of each type of 
controlling shareholder. All the other variables are defined the same as those in previous tables. 
The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard 
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Regression Results of Excess Control Rights Effects on CEO Pay. 
Dependent variable: managerial compensation 
Constant  6.222***(15.82) 6.867***(13.16) 6.090***(15.18) 5.203***(17.16) 
EXCESS 0.003**(2.14) 0.004**(2.42) 0.004**(2.44) 0.002(0.60) 
ROAt-1 3.397***(2.72)    
ROSt-1  2.746***(3.70)   
RETt-1   0.480***(2.95)  
Qt-1    0.462**(2.32) 
EXCESS*ROAt-1 -0.049(-0.75)    
EXCESS*ROSt-1  -0.135***(-3.27)   
EXCESS*RETt-1   -0.016*(-1.82)  
EXCESS*Qt-1    -0.007(-0.78) 
SIZE 0.228***(11.52) 0.186***(6.55) 0.242***(13.03) 0.294***(21.15) 
BOARD 0.263***(4.27) 0.300***(4.32) 0.249***(3.86) 0.242***(4.00) 
INDEP 0.653***(3.31) 0.680***(3.11) 0.576***(2.74) 0.477**(2.35) 
LEV 0.086(1.09) 0.423***(2.70) -0.124**(-2.44) -0.202***(-4.00) 
DUALITY 0.108***(2.62) 0.135***(2.92) 0.084*(1.95) 0.080**(2.00) 
TENURE 0.071***(5.15) 0.701***(4.58) 0.079***(5.68) 0.080***(5.95) 
FOR 0.392***(8.57) 0.415***(8.04) 0.400***(8.21) 0.363***(8.05) 
Industry Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 0.2225 0.2137 0.2081 0.2252 
Obs 3286 3286 3286 3286 
Dependent variable is managerial compensation. Four firm performance variables, ROA, ROS, RET 
and Q, are the industry-adjusted firm performance measures. These performance variables are actually 
fitted values and obtained by regressing them on a set of lagged control variables in their first stage 
regression respectively. EXCESS is the excess control rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder. 
SIZE, BOARD, INDEP, LEV, TENURE, DUALITY and FOR are measured as in Table 1.  
The t-statistics, computed using the White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard error, are given in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 8 
Regression Results of Excess Control Rights of State and Non-state Controlled Firms. 
Dependent variable: managerial compensation 
Constant 6.249***(15.59) 6.379***(14.23) 6.097***(15.16) 5.156***(16.83) 
EXCESS 0.003**(2.01) 0.003**(2.21) 0.003**(2.29) 0.003*(1.65) 
ROAt-1 3.311***(3.35)    
ROSt-1  1.645***(3.39)   
RETt-1   0.433***(3.16)  
Qt-1    0.459***(2.79) 
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PSTATE*ROAt-1 0.060(1.08)    
PSTATE*ROSt-1  0.102***(3.10)   
PSTATE*RETt-1   0.013*(1.77)  
PSTATE*Qt-1    0.005(0.82) 
SIZE 0.228***(11.55) 0.218***(9.47) 0.242***(12.90) 0.295***(20.72) 
BOARD 0.259***(4.26) 0.260***(4.10) 0.252***(3.90) 0.244***(4.03) 
INDEP 0.659***(3.34) 0.759***(3.61) 0.588***(2.80) 0.474**(2.35) 
LEV 0.081(1.06) 0.160(1.50) -0.126**(-2.51) -0.206***(-4.04) 
DUALITY 0.106***(2.62) 0.115***(2.70) 0.082*(1.91) 0.078**(1.96) 
TENURE 0.071***(5.12) 0.076***(5.37) 0.078***(5.51) 0.079***(5.91) 
FOR 0.395***(8.57) 0.419***(8.36) 0.399***(8.21) 0.363***(8.05) 
Industry Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included 
Adjust R
2 
0.2225 0.1543 0.2095 0.2246 
Obs 3286 3286 3286 3286 
Dependent variable is managerial compensation. Four firm performance variables, ROA, ROS, RET 
and Q, are the industry-adjusted firm performance measures. These performance variables are actually 
fitted values and obtained by regressing them on a set of lagged control variables in their first stage 
regression respectively. EXCESS is the excess control rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder. 
PSAMB (PSOE, PPRI) represents the excess control rights of each type of controlling shareholder. 
All other variables are defined the same as those in previous tables. 
The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard 
error. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 9 
Regression Results of Excess Control Rights across Three Types of Firms. 
Dependent variable: managerial compensation 
Constant 6.216***(15.81) 6.399***(14.15) 6.092***(15.20) 5.245***(17.23) 
EXCESS 0.003**(2.07) 0.003**(2.28) 0.004**(2.45) 0.002**(2.47) 
ROAt-1 3.362***(2.69)    
ROSt-1  1.949***(3.13)   
RETt-1   0.482***(2.95)  
Qt-1    0.478**(2.33) 
PSAMB*ROAt-1 -0.060(-0.62)    
PSOE*ROAt-1 -0.028(-0.40)    
PPRI*ROAt-1 -0.064(-0.93)    
PSAMB*ROSt-1  -0.076(-1.52)   
PSOE*ROSt-1  -0.052(-1.49)   
PPRI*ROSt-1  -0.123***(-2.91)   
PSAMB*RETt-1   -0.012(-0.65)  
PSOE*RETt-1   -0.017(-1.56)  
PPRI*RETt-1   -0.016*(-1.80)  
PSAMB*Qt-1    -0.043(-1.07) 
PSOE*Qt-1    -0.012**(-2.10) 
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PPRI*Qt-1    -0.007*(-1.79) 
SIZE 0.229***(11.55) 0.215***(8.92) 0.242***(13.03) 0.293***(21.12) 
BOARD 0.262***(4.25) 0.281***(4.29) 0.249***(3.86) 0.243***(4.02) 
INDEP 0.653***(3.31) 0.705***(3.39) 0.576***(2.74) 0.436**(2.14) 
LEV 0.078(0.98) 0.200*(1.66) -0.123**(-2.42) -0.198***(-3.96) 
DUALITY 0.107***(2.61) 0.123***(2.84) 0.084*(1.95) 0.085**(2.13) 
TENURE 0.071***(5.15) 0.075***(5.24) 0.079***(5.68) 0.080***(5.96) 
FOR 0.392***(8.55) 0.404***(8.26) 0.401***(8.21) 0.367***(8.14) 
Industry Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R
2 
0.2227 0.1434 0.2080 0.2277 
Obs 3286 3286 3286 3286 
Dependent variable is managerial compensation. Four firm performance variables, ROA, ROS, RET 
and Q, are the industry-adjusted firm performance measures. These performance variables are actually 
fitted values and obtained by regressing them on a set of lagged control variables in their first stage 
regression respectively. PSAMB (PSOE, PPRI) represents the excess control rights of each type of 
controlling shareholder. All the other variables are defined the same as those in previous tables. 
The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard 
error. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
